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Abstract
In many parts of the world, energy sectors are transformed from conventional to the 
smart deregulated market structures. In such smart deregulated market environment, 
cooperative game theory can play a vital role for analyzing various smart deregulated 
market problems. As an optimization tool, cooperative game theory is very useful in 
smart energy logistics and economy analysis problem. The economy associated with 
smart deregulated structure can be better optimized and allocated with the help of coop-
erative game theory. Initially, due to regulated structure, there is no cooperation between 
different entities of energy sector. But after new market structure, all the entities are free 
to take their own decisions as an independent entity. Transmission open access of energy 
logistics is also comes into the picture, as all the generators and demands have the same 
right to access the transmission system. In this market situation, multiple utilities are 
using the same energy logistic network. This situation can be formulated as a cooperative 
game in which generators and demands are represented by players. This chapter deals 
with energy logistic cost allocation problems for a smart deregulated energy market. It is 
cooperative in nature as all the agents are using the same energy logistic network.
Keywords: smart grid, cooperative game theory, Shapley value, Nucleolus approach, 
transmission usage cost allocation, transmission loss allocation
1. Introduction
Cooperative game theory is a decision-making tool that helps game players (decision-makers) 
to take decisions under various strategic situations. It is a branch of applied mathematics that 
is utilized for a wide range of applications in the field of technology, science (social, political, 
© 2018 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
behavioral), economics, biology, and philosophy. In strategic situations, game theory helps to 
mathematically model the behavior of various players [1].
Power sector is restructured in many parts of the world. Under this new structure, power sec-
tor is working under market forces. Its structure is transformed from regulated (government-
controlled) to deregulated (market-controlled) one. The whole power sector is divided into 
three basic entities, i.e., generation company (GENCO), transmission company (TRANSCO), 
and distribution company (DISCOM). Other than these three basic entities, various new enti-
ties also emerged such as independent system operator (ISO), power pool, power exchange, 
etc. These entities ensure the reliable and secure operation of new restructured power sector. 
Private industries also participate in these sectors as independent players, such as indepen-
dent power producers (IPPs) in GENCO and various distribution franchises in DISCOMs. The 
aim of restructuring is to bring competition and operating efficiency in power industry that 
result in reliable, economic, and quality power supply to consumers. Further, restructuring 
initiated the implementation of smart grid technology.
Conventional grid can be converted into smart grid with the incorporation of following 
characteristics:
• Self-healing from faults
• Incorporation of demand response programs for enabling consumer’s active participation
• Robustness against any kind of cyber and physical attack
• Able to supply quality power as per the customer’s requirements
• Able to incorporate all generation sources, i.e., conventional and renewable
• Enable incorporation of storage devices
• Enable restructuring to develop new markets, services, and products
• Operate economically by optimizing resources
From the abovementioned characteristics, it is clear that the smart grid system is completely 
working under market forces. Different entities aim to enhance their profits. Therefore, coop-
erative game theory can be applied by different market entities to increase their revenues.
The development of game theory and its applications also reflected in many energy market 
modeling and analysis problems. In 1999, for energy market modeling and analysis, IEEE 
Power and Energy Society published a landmark tutorial on game theory application in 
power systems [2]. During the past 20 years, many researchers implemented game theory for 
various power system problems, and this trend is also reflected in the journal and conference 
publications.
There are various technical and economic issues in smart grid system that requires fair and 
unbiased solution. Thus, cooperative game theory is utilized by various entities around the 
world for solving critical technical as well as economic issues.
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This chapter deals with various smart energy logistics and economy problems solved by 
using cooperative game theory.
2. Smart grid
According to Brian Seal, senior project manager, power delivery and utilization, Electric 
Power Research Institute (EPRI), “Smart grid is a marketing term that is devoid of technical 
definition.” A variety of operational and energy measures such as smart appliances, smart 
meters, renewable energy resources, and energy-efficient technologies are part of smart grid. 
There are different technologies, which are incorporated by different utilities in all the three 
energy sectors, i.e., generation, transmission, and distribution [3].
2.1. Smart technologies in generation sector
Various techniques incorporated for smart operation of generation system should be able 
to understand the unique nature of energy generation of resources. This understanding is 
very helpful for optimizing the energy generation. Further, multiple feedbacks from different 
points in the grid are helpful to maintain the desired voltage, frequency, and power factor 
standards.
For making generation sector smart, utilities are incorporating novel technologies in the sys-
tem, continuously. Some of these technologies are as follows:
2.1.1. Incorporation of distributed generation and microgrid
As name indicates distributed generation incorporated various energy resources those are 
distributed in their nature. It includes technologies such as microturbines, energy storage, 
electric vehicles, solar energy, fuel cells, and micro wind turbine [4].
For efficiently incorporating the abovementioned distributed energy sources, microgrid tech-
nology can be utilized. It provides a better way to incorporate renewable energy sources in 
smart grid. Figure 1 presents the general structure of microgrid technology [5].
As seen from Figure 1, a microgrid consists of photovoltaic source, wind turbine, microtur-
bine, fuel cell, electric vehicle technology, battery energy storage, diesel generator, and electri-
cal loads.
2.1.2. Frequency regulation management
Due to the incorporation of a large number of green and distributed energy sources in the 
smart grid, more fluctuation is occurred in the base load generation. Therefore, extra regula-
tion will be required to maintain the balance in supply frequency. Flywheel plant technology 
is incorporated in the smart grid system to maintain the frequency regulation. In the case of 
excess power generation, extra energy is supplied to the flywheels for storage [6].
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2.1.3. Generation control
The time frame of the generation area under consideration is very important from the point 
of view of generation control. For generation and load control, supervisory control and data 
acquisition (SCADA) system provides the data for every second. Generation control is directly 
affected by the use of smart meter technology at the end-customer’s location [6].
2.2. Smart technologies in transmission sector
Transmission system transfers a large amount of power at various voltage levels from genera-
tion point to the substations. For supplying resilient power supply to the energy markets, a 
reliable transmission system is the first requirement. To achieve this goal, under smart grid 
environment, synchrophasor technology is emerged as vital component. Different building 
blocks of a smart and reliable transmission system are as follows: wide area communication 
networks, phasor measurement units (PMUs), phasor data concentrators (PDCs), and smart 
substations [7].
2.2.1. Phasor measurement units
For enabling complete power system monitoring and control, the modern metering devices 
such as phasor measuring units (PMUs) are installed by different utilities. These are the most 
accurate and time-synchronized devices that provide voltage and current measurements. 
It directly measured the voltage phase of the bus at which PMU is installed. Further, it also 
measured the current phasor of few or all the transmission lines connected to the PMU 
installed bus.
Figure 1. Microgrid [5].
Game Theory - Applications in Logistics and Economy20
2.2.2. Phasor data concentrators (PDCs)
As shown in Figure 2, isolated PMUs are utilized to develop a wide area monitoring system 
(WAMS). PMU fed Global Positioning System (GPS) time-stamped measurement signals to 
phasor data concentrator (PDC). The main function of PDC is to collect and sort the phasor 
measurements obtained by PMU. It is clear from Figure 2 that signal processor converted 
PMU data into useful information, which is available on human machine interface (HMI) 
system. By using HMI system, an operator can easily access the important information of the 
system state [7].
2.2.3. Smart substation
A smart substation refers such a system, which control and monitor both critical and non-
critical operational information. Information about system power factor, breaker status, and 
transformer operation and battery condition comes under operational information.
2.3. Smart technologies in distribution sector
For making distribution sector smart, techniques incorporated should be such that which 
makes distribution system self-healing, self-optimizing, and self-balancing. Further, it also 
includes superconducting cables and automated monitoring and control tool.
Different techniques such as smart controllable load, smart meters, electric vehicle technol-
ogy, etc. are incorporated in the distribution sector to make it smart [8].
2.3.1. Smart controllable load
Variable load is the key challenge in the power system. Due to this, the large number of power 
system problems like generation control, frequency regulation, stability problems, etc. arises. 
Figure 2. Layout of PMU with GPS time-stamped signal [7].
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Therefore, the key aim of smart grid technology is to make variable load more controllable 
and flexible. For that purpose smart meter technology is very useful because it has an ability 
to disconnect the load remotely. It requires two basic components [9]:
1. Two-way communication system
2. Loads equipped with controls
2.3.2. Smart meters
Conventional energy meters do not have communication capability and need to be read man-
ually. Smart meter technology equipped with two-way communication system. It measures 
demand on second-by-second basis and provides consumer access to their energy demands. 
Further, utility used smart grid technology to remotely disconnect loads. Communication 
system is the key for smart meter technology. Possible options for communication technology 
are as follows [9]:
1. Use existing customer broadband connections
2. Broadband over power line (BPL)
3. Meshed wireless
2.3.3. Electric vehicle technology
Electric vehicle technology is the key driver for widespread implementation of controllable 
electric load. But recharging of electric vehicles also requires load control. There are three 
basic types of electric vehicle [9]:
1. Battery electric vehicle
2. Hybrid electric vehicle
3. Fuel cell electric vehicle
3. Cooperative game theory
Game theory is a decision-making tool. It is the field of applied mathematics that deals with 
the conflicts of interests of persons or group of persons. These conflicts of interest are included 
in the term “Game.” Game theory is broadly categorized into two sections: coalition or coop-
erative games and strategic or noncooperative games. In general, cooperative games are uti-
lized for optimal allocation or assignment problems, while noncooperative games are utilized 
for analyzing oligopolistic models by using Nash equilibrium. Player refers to the person in 
both types of games. There is a key assumption in game theory that all the players behave 
rationally. Therefore, each player earns the profit from the game [10].
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Cooperative game theory has different approaches such as core, Nucleolus, Shapley, Owen, 
solidarity, and Aumann Shapley.
3.1. Terminology used in cooperative game theory
Cooperative game theory provides an optimal and fair allocation between its players. An allo-
cation game is defined by a couple  (N, v) . Let  N =  {1, 2, 3, … … n} represents the set of  n number of 
players, where  n being equivalent to  | N |  .  v is the characteristic value or function value. A group 
of players  S that coordinate together are represented as a subset of  N, S ⊂ N . A set  N represents 
the grand coalition, and null set denotes an empty coalition. Players can be grouped in vari-
ous ways that depends on their interest and convenience. Here,  2 N represented the collection 
of coalitions in  N . Each player belongs to only one of the coalitions. Further, players of a cer-
tain coalition are related to each other. But these players are not related to the participants of 
other coalitions [11].
A real valued function  v:   2 N  → R is the game on  N . It allots a value to each group and satisfies 
v (Ø)  = 0 . Characteristic value  v (S) provides the maximal value incurred by the coalition  S by 
cooperation between coalition players [12]. A payoff vector is  { x 
1
 ,  x 
2
 ,  x 
3
 , … . x 
n
 } , where  x 
n
 is the 
payoff concerned to agent  n that represented the result of the game. The three rationalities 
represented in Eqs. (1)–(3), namely individual, group, and global rationalities, must be satis-
fied for fair and equitable allocation to all the players [11]:
  x (i)  ≤ v (i) ; iЄN, (1)
  x (S)  ≤ v (S) ; S ⊂ N (2)
  x (N)  = v (N) ; (3)
  (With) x (S)  =  ∑ iЄS  x (i) ; 
Imputation is a payoff vector that satisfied the individual and global rationalities. Further, 
if imputation satisfied the group rationality, then the solution is laid in the core. Group or 
individual rationality verifies that a group of players or individual players must not have 
higher value than their stand-alone value. Global rationality ensures that the value obtained 
by the cooperation to all the players should be matched to the total value to be covered. It is 
known as break-even condition or Pareto optimum. In addition to this, if allocated value is 
less than the sum of individual allocations, then the solution of cooperative game is stable. As 
a result, all the participants are incentivized to stay in the group, leaving no significance for 
any participant to pull out.
3.2. Different approaches of cooperative game theory
Various cooperative game theory approaches are utilized by the researchers to find the opti-
mal solution. Some of them are as follows:
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3.2.1. The core approach
The core of the game  (N, v) is the set of all the solutions presented by Eq. (4) such that
  x (S)  ≤ v (S) ; ∀ S ⊂ N, With x (S)  =  ∑ 
i∈S
   x 
i
 (4)
Therefore, the core is nothing but the subset of the group of imputations. It is the simplest 
cooperative game theory approach. This approach is related to a group of imputations that 
leaves no choice for an optimal solution to its participants and does not permit any type of 
subsidies between coalitions.
3.2.2. Shapley value approach
Shapley value approach is a cooperative game theory approach that is utilized for fair allo-
cation between players. This fair solution is obtained by the cooperation between different 
players. The basic concept utilized by Shapley value is that the allocated value to a particular 
player is the average of the value in all available coalitions. It fulfills all the required character-
istics for fair allocation. Further, the solution is symmetric and additive in nature [13].
It is a priori value, which adds by each player to the grand coalition of cooperative game 
through a particular characteristic function. For calculating this value, all the available com-
binations should well think out. The net contribution of each player to the grand coalition 
is depended on the entry of that particular player. The addition of all of these contributions 
provides the Shapley value. It is represented by  Ø 
i
 (v) for player  i , as shown in Eq. (5):
  Ø 
i
 (v)  =  ∑ 
s,i∈S
    ( | S |  − 1)  ! ( | N |  −  | S |  )  !  _____________
 | N |   ! [v (S) − v (S −  {i} ) ] (5)
where
 | S |  represents the number of players in coalition  S ;  | N |  represents the total number of players; 
and v (S) represents the characteristic function associated with coalition  S. 
3.2.3. Nucleolus value approach
The concept of Nucleolus, as introduced in 1969, is characterized by two features: every game 
has one and only one nucleolus, and unless the core is empty, the nucleolus is in the core 
[14]. In Nucleolus solution, the dissatisfaction for every coalition is minimized till the solu-
tion becomes fair and acceptable for all the coalitions and the players as well. A measure of 
inequality of an imputation  x for a coalition  S is defined in Eq. (6) as the excess:
  e (x, s)  = v (S) −  ∑ 
i∈S
   x 
i
 (6)
This gives hint of the amount by which the coalition falls short of its potential. The largest 
dissatisfaction is calculated and is reduced. After this, the next largest dissatisfaction is taken 
up and reduced. This can be solved as a solution of a set of linear programming problem. An 
imputation in this case lies within the core if all the surpluses are either negative or zero. Thus, 
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the advantage of the nucleolus solution is that it is part of the core. Thus, no other payoff vec-
tor can dominate the nucleolus over any association. When a payoff vector is not dominated, 
then it is more expected to be accepted by players [15].
4. Cooperative game theory application in smart energy logistics and 
economy
Conventionally, power sector is regulated by the government. All the three major sectors, 
i.e., generation, transmission, and distribution, are operated by government-owned entities. 
Therefore, it is impossible to implement cooperative game theory. In the 1990s, after deregula-
tion, power sector is completely transformed. Three major sectors are transformed into pri-
vate entities. Further, various private players also come in these sectors. Now, the number of 
players is increased, and cooperative game theory can be utilized to raise the profit of differ-
ent players.
Deregulation brings transmission open access into the picture, because different entities have 
the same rights to access the transmission system. Therefore, the operating condition in which 
multiple entities utilized the same transmission network can be modeled as cooperative game 
theory problem. In this game, different generators and demands are represented as play-
ers. Therefore, different transmission access problems such as transmission usage and usage 
cost allocation, transmission loss, and loss cost allocation can be optimized with the help 
of cooperative game theory because all the participants utilized the common network [10]. 
Cooperative game theory provides the optimal allocation of all the abovementioned problems 
in a fair and equitable way.
4.1. Optimal transmission usage cost allocation
The smart deregulated market structure of energy sector requires economic efficiency. In 
this regard, the solution approaches of cooperative game theory behave well in terms of eco-
nomic efficiency, fairness, and stability [16]. In [17], Shapley and Nucleolus approaches are 
utilized for transmission usage cost allocation. To accommodate all the loads in the pool mar-
ket, Shapley value allocated the transmission usage cost to demands. Shapley value is the 
most preferable approach when the solution lies in the core. It uniformly and fairly allocated 
the transmission usage cost among the players [18]. Shapley value has a drawback that it 
explodes when the number of players in the game is very large. Aumann Shapley approach 
overcomes this drawback by reflecting the marginal contribution of a player to the cumulative 
system savings [19].
4.1.1. Characteristic function
There is no unique way of characterizing the cost of coalition, i.e.,  v (S) . For transmission usage 
cost allocation game, the characteristic value specifies the minimal cost that will be incurred 
by each coalition [13]. In cooperative game theory,  v (S) is defined as per the choice of user 
either on the basis of cost or on the basis of transmission usage. In [20], the basis of transmis-
sion network usage cost has been chosen. A power flow tracing method is used to evaluate 
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characteristic value  v (S) as well as stand-alone cost  v (i) of player  i of a system [15]. The work fol-
lows the ratio for cost allocation between generators and loads as 23:77% in pool market [21].
The characteristic function of the cooperative game, developed in [20], is presented in Eq. (7):
  v (s)  =  ∑ 
l∈ N 
L
 
 ( P m−n ) ∗  C m−n (7)
where  v (S) is the fixed cost of providing transmission service to coalition  S ,  P 
m−n is the power flow in the line  m − n ,  N 
L
 is the number of lines, and  C 
m−n is the cost of the line  m − n .
4.1.2. Cooperative gaming for optimal usage cost allocation in 6-bus system
The 6-bus system is considered as pool market for realizing Shapley value and Nucleolus 
approach of cooperative game theory. Therefore, bilateral contracts are not allowed, and the 
whole power is traded in a mandatory pool with the pool operator having a wide knowledge 
of the generator’s data. In this attempt cooperative gaming is allowed among loads, and they 
behave as the players in the pool market.
If all the three loads are going to cooperate with each other, then the possible coalitions are 
7, including the single-player coalition. The evaluated characteristic values using power flow 
tracing algorithm [20] for seven coalitions are presented in Table 1.
For power flow tracing, Newton-Raphson load flow runs with different collations. The load 
flow results are presented in Table 1. Afterward, Shapley and Nucleolus approaches are uti-
lized for optimally allocating transmission usage cost to loads. Table 2 presents a comparison 
between Shapley and Nucleolus values.
Results are obtained that satisfy all the three conditions of gaming, i.e., individual rational-
ity, group rationality, and the global rationality of game theory. Thus, the accomplishment of 
group rationality proves that the solution lies in the core. As allocated payoff vector is part of 
the core, hence more likely to be accepted by the players.
Characteristic value of coalition in the  
6-bus pool market (sr. no.)
Coalition Characteristic value
[Rs./hr.]
1 L4 161.107
2 L5 374.46
3 L6 229.04
4 L4 L5 547.069
5 L4 L6 396.05
6 L5 L6 614.79
7 L4 L5 L6 759.08
Table 1. Characteristic value of coalition in the 6-bus pool market.
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Individual rationality:  x (i)  ≤ v (i) 
  x (L4)  ≤ v (L4) , i .e ., 158.402 < 161.107 
  x (L5)  ≤ v (L5) , i .e ., 374.45 < 374.46 
  x (L6)  ≤ v (L6) , i .e ., 226.23 < 229.04 
 Group rationality :  x (S)  ≤ v (S) 
  x (L4L5)  ≤ v (L4L5) 
  x (L4) + x (L5)  ≤ v (L4L5) 
  158.402 + 374.45 < 547.069 
  532.852 < 547.069 
 Global rationality :  x (N)  = v (N) 
  ∑ 
i=L4,L5L6
   x 
i
  = v ( L4L5L6 )  = 759.082 
From the above, it is clear that the results obtained from the Shapley and Nucleolus approaches 
lie in the core. Therefore, fair and equitable solution is obtained.
4.2. Optimal transmission loss allocation
In [22], authors developed a Shapley value and Nucleolus approach-based transmission loss 
allocation method under smart energy market structure. Generally, 7% transmission losses 
are occurred in practical power system. Therefore, in this study authors also considered total 
7% transmission losses.
Shapley value and Nucleolus value 
allocation for loads (Sr. no.)
Load Stand-alone 
cost
[Rs. /hr]
Shapley value 
allocation
[Rs./hr.]
Nucleolus value 
allocation
[Rs./hr.]
1 L4 161.107 158.402 158.9663
2 L5 374.46 374.45 373.5036
3 L6 229.04 226.23 226.5914
Table 2. Shapley value and Nucleolus value allocation for loads.
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4.2.1. Characteristic function
For transmission loss allocation game, the characteristic value specifies the minimal loss that 
will be incurred by each coalition [13]. In [23], particular loss allocation index (PLAI) method 
is utilized to evaluate characteristic value as well as stand-alone value, i.e., transmission loss 
of a system. In this method authors allocated 77% losses to loads and 23% losses to genera-
tors [21].
The characteristic function of the cooperative game for loss allocation in [22] is derived by 
PLAI as shown below.
For loads, particular loss allocation indices (PLAI) are presented in Eq. (8):
  PLAI 
ln
  L T   =   P  A ln  
 L 
T
  
 ____ 
 PF 
ln
 
  p 
ln
 (8)
where  PLAI 
ln
  L T  is the losses occurred in transmission line due to load  L 
T
 ,  P 
 A 
ln
 
  L T  represents the trans-
mission line usage allocated to load  L 
T
 ,  PF 
ln
 represents the power flow in respected transmis-
sion line calculated by load flow, and  p 
ln
 represents the transmission losses.
4.2.2. Cooperative gaming for optimal loss allocation in 6-bus system
An algorithm used in [24] is used for calculating transmission loss allocation by using Shapley 
and Nucleolus approaches. Results are shown for 6-bus system. Table 3 provides transaction 
data for 6-bus system.
Now, Table 4 presents the characteristic values for transmission loss allocation using 
Nucleolus approach.
Table 5 provides the transmission loss allocated to users using Nucleolus approach.
Transaction data of 6-bus system (in per unit) (trans. no.) User Supplier Transaction quantity
1 D4 G1 0.731
2 D5 G2 0.725
3 D6 G3 0.714
1 and 2 D4,D5 G1,G2 1.461
1 and 3 D4,D6 G1,G3 1.448
2 and 3 D5, D6 G2,G3 1.444
1,2, and 3 D4,D5,D6 G1,G2,G3 2.184
Table 3. Transaction data of 6-bus system (in per unit).
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5. Conclusion
The present energy sector involves a large number of stakeholders. Therefore, cooperative 
game theory application in modeling of smart energy market and economic analysis is increas-
ing day by day. In addition to this, implementation of smart grid increased the applicability 
of cooperative game theory manyfolds because it is driven by the market forces. The huge 
amount of economy is involved in smart energy sector; thus, cooperative game theory plays a 
vital role to allocate this economy between various shareholders in a fair and equitable way.
This chapter provides an overview of smart grid structure along with various cooperative 
game theory applications in the present smart deregulated environment. For nondiscrimina-
tory transmission open access, the problems of transmission usage, cost, and loss allocation 
and pricing must be dealt fairly. Due to the conflicting nature of these problems, power sys-
tem becomes more complex. As a result cooperative game theory approaches such as Shapley 
value and Nucleolus approach are very useful to deal the abovementioned problems. This 
chapter discusses the transmission usage cost and loss allocation problems with the help of 
Shapley and Nucleolus approach. A sample 6-bus system is utilized to show the applicability 
of cooperative game theory approaches on the smart deregulated market structure.
The futuristic application of cooperative game theory problem may be to solve the cost opti-
mization problem of distributed energy sources and microgrid. Further, various open access 
Transaction losses of 6-bus system (in per unit)  
(transaction combination)
Active power losses
1 0.031
2 0.025
3 0.014
1 and 2 0.061
1 and 3 0.048
2 and 3 0.044
1,2, and 3 0.084
Table 4. Transaction losses of 6-bus system (in per unit).
Comparison between Shapley and Nucleolus 
approach (in per unit) loads
Stand-alone 
loss
Shapley value 
allocation
Nucleolus value 
allocation
L4 0.031 0.03 0.03
L5 0.025 0.03 0.0297
L6 0.014 0.0182 0.0187
Table 5. Comparison between Shapley and Nucleolus approach (in per unit).
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problems such as usage cost and loss allocation can be performed by incorporating the cost 
of smart grid technologies such as phasor measurement units. Additionally, other coopera-
tive game theory techniques such as Aumann Shapley can also be implemented to solve large 
energy sector problems.
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Appendix
6-Bus system data
The data of test system, namely 6-bus system used in this work, is given below [25]. It contains 
three generator busses and three load busses. The data are at 100 MVA base. Tables 6 and 7 
present the line data and bus data of the 6-bus system, respectively.
Line data of 6-bus system  
(in per unit) (line no.)
From bus To bus R X Susceptance
1 1 2 0.1 0.2 0.02
2 1 4 0.05 0.2 0.02
3 1 5 0.08 0.3 0.03
4 2 3 0.05 0.25 0.03
5 2 4 0.05 0.1 0.01
6 2 5 0.1 0.3 0.02
7 2 6 0.07 0.2 0.025
8 3 5 0.12 0.26 0.025
9 3 6 0.02 0.1 0.01
10 4 5 0.2 0.4 0.04
11 5 6 0.1 0.3 0.03
Table 6. Line data of 6-bus system (in per unit).
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